Stockwell 1 – the recommendations
The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) made 16 recommendations for change to the police service as a result of the Stockwell investigation. These recommendations were addressed to HMIC, Home Office, ACPO and the MPS.
In drawing up these recommendations the IPCC has worked closely with Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC.) The recommendations were:
POLICE USE OF FIREARMS
Command & control
1] Concern
Despite Commander DICK making it clear she was in command of all aspects
of the firearms operation there remains the potential for confusion between
the respective roles of Gold, Silver and Designated Senior Officer.
Recommendation HMIC
To review existing policy and guidance in relation to the command and control
of firearms operations to ensure there is absolute clarity of role and
responsibility within the chain of command, particularly when a Designated
Senior Officer is deployed. This should include deployments conducted
under the auspices of Operations Kratos and Operation C.
2] Concern
Despite being appointed as the Designated Senior Officer, the strategic
briefing chaired by Commander MCDOWALL commenced before
Commander DICK’s arrival due to inaccurate information being provided to
her regarding the location of where the briefing was to be held.
Recommendation HMIC
To review existing guidance and practice to ensure Gold, Silver and Bronze
commanders have a clear and common understanding of the circumstances
surrounding future firearms operations, the overall strategy and the key
tactical options under consideration.
3] Concern
No formal recording was made of any of the briefings prior to the deployment
of firearms and surveillance officers. Thereafter there was no audio recording
of what was communicated within the Operations Room. Such recordings
would have provided an audit trail regarding the information that was received
by the room and the decisions that were then transmitted. Some staff working
in the Operations Room expressed concerns regarding the noise generated
within it and how that may have affected its effectiveness.
Recommendation HMIC
To review existing practice to ensure that at a corporate level robust and
appropriate facilities and mechanisms exist to maintain the effective
command and control of future operations of a similar nature. Particular
attention should be paid to ensuring that key briefings, strategic and tactical
decisions are fully recorded or documented and in any event capable of audit.
4] Concern
The strategy set by the Gold Commander was not implemented. The strategy
made it clear that all persons leaving Scotia Road would be stopped either as
suspects or as potential intelligence sources. Six persons left the flats before
Mr De Menezes. Due to insufficient resources being in place, none were
stopped.
Recommendation HMIC
To review the existing mechanisms and policy for ensuring that sufficient and
robust channels of communication exist that provide commanders with ‘real-
time’ updates on intelligence, operational and resourcing issues that could
adversely impact the successfully implementation of the overall strategic
parameters and the identified tactical options and that robust procedures are
in place to ensure that the necessary fast-time action is taken in the early
stages of an incident to achieve this.
5] Concern
There was no threat assessment and the risk assessments undertaken for
this operation did not consider the risk of misidentification or uncertainty
regarding the identification of a suspect. The assessment did not consider a
suspect leaving the premises before firearms resources were in place.
Recommendation HMIC
To review existing procedures and training for carrying out assessments for
operations of this nature incorporating lessons learnt from this incident
Operational considerations
6] Concern
There was a substantial delay between the time the firearms team were
requested and when they were deployed. By the time Mr De Menezes left
Scotia Road at 09:33hrs CO19 officers were still not in place despite being
initially requested at 05:05hrs.
Recommendation HMIC
To review existing policy and practice to ensure that when, in pursuance of an
armed operation, it is necessary to stop or otherwise detain potential subjects
of a surveillance operation appropriate firearms support is in place to expedite
a prompt and safe resolution of the encounter.
7] Concern
There was a lack of clarity about the command to ‘stop’ the suspect given the
likely mindset of the firearms officers. They were deployed on an anti terrorist
operation the day after unsuccessful attempts were made to cause explosions
within the underground system. They had been issued with special
ammunition. They knew a Designated Senior Officer was in command.
Recommendation HMIC
To review existing policy and guidance to ensure absolute clarity exists in the
use of operationally specific terminology. Particular attention is to be paid to
ensuring the terminology used for deployments under the auspices of
Operations Kratos and Operation C are entirely consistent with the common
language of command for regular firearms deployments in response to
serious crime operations.
SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS
8] Concern
The S012 surveillance team, the CO19 Specialist Firearms Officers and those
in command were not used to working together and were not sufficiently
familiar with each others working practices.
Recommendation HMIC
To review existing policy and operational capability in relation to the
deployment of surveillance teams on firearms operations to ensure that
deployment fully complements and supports rapid armed intervention should
such subsequently become necessary.
9] Concern
It was only the views of the surveillance team leader that were communicated
in relation to the identification of the suspect. The fact that two surveillance
officers believed that the person being followed was not the suspect should
have been communicated to the Designated Senior Officer as it may have
assisted her decision making.
Recommendation HMIC
To review existing policy and practice to ensure joint firearms and
surveillance operations are fully integrated and that channels exist to ensure
salient developments, such as doubts over a target’s identity, can be swiftly
communicated to relevant strategic and operational commanders.
10] Concern
The completion of the supplementary surveillance log has been proved to
involve alterations which changed the meaning of the entry.
Recommendation HMIC
To review existing policy and practice to ensure that at a corporate level
robust facilities and processes exist to demonstrate the integrity of evidence
gathered during the course of surveillance operations. Particular attention
should be paid to the continued utility of surveillance logs.
POST INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
11] Concern
The incident was not referred until 15:21hrs on Monday 25 July and until that
time the IPCC was prevented from starting an investigation on the instruction
of the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. The rationale given by the
Commissioner for this decision relating to the IPCC’s powers and duties was
not correct.
At the present time the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2004
require the police to refer complaints and allegations of misconduct that are
subject to mandatory referral (such as death and serious injuries) to the IPCC
no later than the end of the working day following the day on which the
complaint was made or the conduct came to the attention of the appropriate
authority.
Recommendation Home Office
That all mandatory referrals to the IPCC should occur, particularly in the case
of death or serious injury, as soon as possible but in any event not later than
the end of the day following the following the incident, complaint or
misconduct and that the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations
2004 should be amended accordingly.
12] Concern
The difference in the treatment of police and civilian witnesses to this incident
are not acceptable or justifiable. Members of the public were expected to be
interviewed and make statements soon after witnessing a most traumatic
incident without being able confer with other witnesses and provide a joint
account. The police officers involved were allowed to return to their own
base, refresh themselves and confer. This was and is accepted practice.
However, the IPCC has raised its concerns regarding the post incident
procedures put in place after other incidents where police firearms are
discharged.
Recommendation HMIC
To review existing guidance and practice to ensure that appropriate and
robust mechanisms exist to secure an accurate and auditable record of ‘hot’
and team/group debriefs.
13] Concern
Officers involved in the incident wrote up their notes together. This is current
practice but makes those accounts less credible. Such practices were agreed
in the protocol between the police service and the IPCC in July 2004.
Recommendation ACPO
To review efficacy of existing post incident management policy, guidance and
practice to ensure an appropriate balance exists between being rightly held to
account for one’s actions whilst discharging the office of Constable and the
rights of the principal officers. Particular attention should be paid to the need
to ensure that individual accounts are obtained in a proximate and transparent
manner that is consistent with the rules of evidence, the duty of
care to staff and the need to secure public confidence. Post-incident
procedures should be revised to ensure that officers do not write up their
notes together.
COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE
14] Concern
Command and control of this incident was inevitably lost when CO19 officers
entered the underground. Had there been any update regarding the
uncertainty surrounding the identification at this point it would have been
impossible to communicate.
Recommendation MPS
That in collaboration with partners in Transport for London and British
Transport Police the Metropolitan Police Service undertake to ensure that
communications are harmonised and facilitate the command and control of
operations conducted within the London Underground network.
TRAINING AND EXERCISES
15] Concern
Events during July 2005 confronted the Metropolitan Police Service with a
series of challenges that had not been experienced before. Whilst terrorist
attacks on the transport system had been predicted, the MPS relied on the
ACPO Firearms manual and the Kratos policy to combat such an attack. It is
apparent that more was required. The IPCC wants to ensure that police
service and individual police officers have learnt as much as possible from the
events of 22 July and have the best possible preparation for dealing with
similar situations in future.
Recommendation HMIC
The MPS, HMIC, ACPO, NPIA, Home Office and other relevant agencies
should revise planning, exercises and training provided for those involved in
anti-terrorist policing to ensure such processes fully incorporate all the
learning from the events of 22 July.
As soon as legal procedures permit, the experience of those officers directly
involved, including staff from the IPCC should be fed into those reviews.
COMMUNITY REASSURANCE
16] Concern
The IPCC has noted the positive response given by members of the
Community Reference Group and other community representatives to the
steps taken by the then Lambeth Borough Commander and other statutory
bodies to provide community reassurance in the aftermath of all the events in
July 2005. The IPCC witnessed some of this at first hand. We commend
Chief Superintendent Martin BRIDGER and his officers for an excellent job
facing the communities directly, listening to their concerns and seeking to
restore their confidence. It was reported to us that this had been achieved as
a result of the community police liaison arrangements.
Recommendation HMIC
The good practice in place in Lambeth which ensured effective community
reassurance should be noted by the MPS and HMIC. Steps should be taken
to ensure that where appropriate, this good practice is replicated in other
BCUs.
* The recommendations can be found in the IPCC report 'Stockwell One Investigation into the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes at Stockwell underground station on 22 July 2005.' The report can be found on the IPCC website.
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Notes for editors
The IPCC has overall responsibility for the police complaints system. Since April 2006 it has taken on responsibility for similar, serious complaints against HM Revenue and Customs and the Serious Organised Crime Agency in England and Wales.
The IPCC has the task of increasing public confidence in the complaint systems and aims to make investigations more open, timely, proportionate and fair.
The 16 Commissioners who run the IPCC guarantee its independence and by law can never have served as police officers. No Commissioner has worked for HM Revenue and Customs. They are supported by more than more than 200 independent IPCC investigators, casework managers and other specialists.
Since April 1 2004 the IPCC has used its powers to begin 171 independent and 533 managed investigations into the most serious complaints against the police. It has set new standards for police forces to improve the way the public's complaints are handled. The Commission also handles appeals by the public about the way their complaint was dealt with by the local force.
The IPCC is committed to getting closer to the communities it serves. Its Commissioners and staff are based in IPCC regional offices in Cardiff, Coalville, London and Sale plus a sub office in Wakefield.
The IPCC web site is constantly updated at www.ipcc.co.uk or members of the public can contact the IPCC on 08453 002 002.