Publication of the stockwell one report - statement from NicK Hardwick, IPCC chair

Good morning.

The Independent Police Complaints Commission today publishes the report of its investigation into the fatal shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes by officers of the Metropolitan Police Service on 22 July 2005.

The investigation was led and the report was written by IPCC Senior Investigator John Cummins who is with me today. I am also joined by IPCC Commissioner, Deborah Glass, who leads for us on firearms issues and assisted me with the recommendations.

As Chairman of the IPCC, I oversaw the investigation.

Before I turn to the substance of the report, let me say a little about the process.

We have attached a foreword to the report, written since the Health and Safety trial, which explains its structure, purpose and background.

Our investigation was completed within six months and we share the frustration that it was not possible to conclude the legal processes more quickly.

This is not just something that afflicted the Stockwell case. It happens in other less high profile cases which are nonetheless just as painful for the families and officers involved.

Although the IPCC has significantly improved on the system it inherited, it still takes too long to bring some cases to a conclusion.

We expect radical changes to the police discipline system to be included in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill which was announced on Tuesday in the Queen's Speech. These reforms should speed up the system significantly. They have very wide support and we look forward to them being enacted.

However, in this case, with this system, the first proper and lawful place for the evidence we obtained in our investigation to be set out was in open court in front of a jury.

It was the evidence the IPCC produced that formed the basis of the trial. If you followed the trial, you have already heard most of it. What is new in this report, are the operational recommendations we made twenty months ago to try and prevent a similar thing ever happening again.

There has been some ill-informed comment about the trial and the evidence disclosed at it.

Some commentators appear to have forgotten the terrible events of July 2005. One of the early things our investigative team did when we began the investigation was to gather all the media coverage we could that recorded the atmosphere of that time.

No one at the IPCC will forget the pressure the Metropolitan Police were under as they worked to find and arrest the terrorists responsible for the attacks on the London transport system.

We will not allow others to forget it.

It has been suggested that the ordinary law, in this case the health and safety law, should not apply to the police service, and that this trial will make it more difficult for the police to catch real terrorists.

That is the wrong road.

The defining feature of the police in this country is that the law applies to them individually and as a service just as it does to every other citizen and organisation. This case is not about creating a more risk-averse police service but a more coherent and effective police response to real threats.

The commentators to whom we should pay most attention are the jury of ordinary Londoners who for a whole month carefully listened to all the evidence and came to a clear verdict. Very serious mistakes were made that could and should have been avoided. But we have to take the utmost care before singling out any individual for blame. Those with strong views about the case would do well to study the evidence with the care the jury did.

There are two very stark images from the now infamous CCTV coverage of Stockwell Station.

The first is of Jean Charles de Menezes entering the station, wearing light summer clothing, picking up a paper and going to get his train.

The second, just over a minute later, shows police officers running down into the depths of the station, into what I am sure they believed was deadly peril, the first passengers, alarmed by the arrival of police officers, were hurrying to escape in the other direction.

Neither Mr de Menezes nor the police officers are diminished by us remembering the tragedy of one and the heroism of others on that day.

Let me be clear what the trial was not about. It was not about the split second decisions that the firearms officers had to make when they confronted Jean Charles de Menezes in that tube train - nor indeed just about the death of Jean Charles de Menezes himself, terrible though that was.

The questions the trial did address and indeed the ones the public were asking in the aftermath of the incident were these:

'If they thought he might have a bomb, why was he allowed twice to get on a bus and then on the tube?' 'If they thought he didn't have a bomb, why did they shoot him?'

Nor must there be any attempt to blame Jean Charles de Menezes himself for his fate.

He did nothing out of the ordinary.

He looked over his shoulder as he walked to catch his bus; he got back on his bus when he found Brixton tube station was closed; he texted his friend; he hurried down the final few steps of the escalator when he saw a train was already on the platform; and, like other passengers, he got to his feet when police officers burst onto the train. These actions may have been misinterpreted by police officers hunting a suicide bomber but they were entirely innocent.

The priority for the police service now, and those responsible for the police, is to do everything possible to ensure the mistakes made on 22 July 2005 are not repeated.

In drawing up our recommendations we worked closely with Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. I am grateful to Sir Ronnie Flanagan and his team for their assistance.

I want to emphasise six points.

First, much has been said about the 'Kratos' Policy or so called 'Shoot to Kill' tactics. In fact, the Kratos policy was not invoked on 22 July. The Kratos code words were not used.

However, it has become clearer since we wrote our report that there is much more doubt in the police service itself about the efficacy of the Kratos policy.

In our report, we also called for wider public debate and understanding of the tactical options available to the police service for combating the threat of suicide bombers.

In my view it is imperative that the public and their representatives are included in the discussion that is already underway in the police service about the future of the Kratos policy.

Second, the most fundamental problem on that Friday was the implementation of the strategy set by Commander McDowall, the Gold Commander, that everyone leaving the premises was to be stopped once they were a safe distance away and questioned either for the intelligence they could provide or as a suspect. That never happened – and could not happen because the firearms teams needed to support these stops were not deployed in time to do so.

I do not suggest it was easy to maintain a common understanding of what needed to be done by the officers reacting to fast moving events at different times and in different locations.

The challenge for those who have addressed our recommendations is to identify what can be learnt from this incident to deal more effectively with the complex inter-layering of command, training and communication issues involved.

Third, failures of communication occurred in a number of ways: at the briefings of firearms officers; between the surveillance team and both the control room and firearms teams; the firearms and surveillance teams were not used to working together; the officers in the control room whose job it was to monitor the surveillance complained about the noise and confusion in the room; there was a lack of clarity in the command to 'stop' Jean Charles de Menezes entering the underground system; police radios did not work underground.

These failing need to be addressed through organisational, training and technical changes.

Fourth, it is essential that all the relevant agencies incorporate the experience from 22 July 2005 in their planning, exercises and training for dealing with a terrorist attack. The experience of those officers directly involved in this incident should be fed into that process.

Fifth, other recommendations address what happened after Jean Charles de Menezes was shot. The Commissioner attempted to prevent us carrying out an investigation. In my view, much of the avoidable difficulty the Stockwell incident has caused the Metropolitan Police arose from the delay in referral. In June 2006 the regulations were changed to put beyond doubt the IPCC's powers to investigate an incident of this kind. Other concerns about the post-incident procedures still have to be resolved.

Finally, I want to recognise the good work that was done in Lambeth following the shooting. I saw for myself the very effective and practical measures that were taken to reassure all sections of the community. This is good practice that should be copied elsewhere.

To achieve public confidence that the recommendations we made are being implemented, it has been necessary for the Metropolitan Police to accept that mistakes were made.

I think the defence the Metropolitan Police adopted at the health and safety trial may have created some confusion in the public mind about their willingness to do this. In practice however, there is no such doubt. It is clear to me that the Metropolitan Police have accepted and have acted on our recommendations.

I have studied the review Her Majesty's Inspectors have carried out of the progress that has been made by the Metropolitan Police in implementing these recommendations. Significant progress has been made. Of the 16 recommendations, 10 have been implemented, 4 have been partially implemented or await further considerations, and 2 await changes to national guidance.

The Inspectors have reported that the Metropolitan Police have accepted all the IPCC's recommendations and demonstrated a willingness to learn from experience, no matter how painful. The Inspectors have also reported that learning has been profound. These changes have already been put into effect and informed the successful handling of the terrorist attacks in London and Glasgow earlier this year.

We accept and welcome this.

This work is not yet complete and more needs to be done both by the Metropolitan Police and to roll out these lessons nationally.

Nevertheless, I am satisfied that the death of Jean Charles de Menezes has been a catalyst for significant improvements in the way in which the police deal with the threat of suicide terrorism. Those improvements make it less likely that there will be other innocent victims of police shootings but, as the Inspectors' review makes very clear, much more likely that the police will be able to respond effectively to an actual terrorist threat. London and Londoners should be safer as a result. It should not have taken the death of an innocent man to achieve that.

-ends-

Notes for editors

The report can be found on the IPCC website.

The IPCC has overall responsibility for the police complaints system. Since April 2006 it has taken on responsibility for similar, serious complaints against HM Revenue and Customs and the Serious Organised Crime Agency in England and Wales.

The IPCC has the task of increasing public confidence in the complaint systems and aims to make investigations more open, timely, proportionate and fair.

The 16 Commissioners who run the IPCC guarantee its independence and by law can never have served as police officers. No Commissioner has worked for HM Revenue and Customs. They are supported by more than more than 200 independent IPCC investigators, casework managers and other specialists.

Since April 1 2004 the IPCC has used its powers to begin 171 independent and 533 managed investigations into the most serious complaints against the police. It has set new standards for police forces to improve the way the public's complaints are handled. The Commission also handles appeals by the public about the way their complaint was dealt with by the local force.

The IPCC is committed to getting closer to the communities it serves. Its Commissioners and staff are based in IPCC regional offices in Cardiff, Coalville, London and Sale plus a sub office in Wakefield.

The IPCC web site is constantly updated at www.ipcc.gov.uk or members of the public can contact the IPCC on 08453 002 002.