

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

**An investigation into the
circumstances around serious injuries
sustained by Mr [REDACTED] and Mr
[REDACTED] on 12 January 2016**

Independent Investigation
Final Report

IPCC Reference: 2016/059908

Contents

- Introduction 3
 - The purpose of this report 3
 - Background 3
 - Terms of Reference 4
- Summary of the evidence 5
- Analysis of the Evidence 8
- Conclusions 10
 - Death and serious injury investigations 11
 - What contact did ██████████ ██████████ and ██████████ have with the police? 11
 - To what extent did that contact cause or contribute to their injuries? 11
 - Why having regard to the evidence, there is no indication that any person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner that would justify the bringing of criminal proceedings. 12
 - Provisional organisational learning recommendations 12
- Appendix 1: The role of the IPCC 12
 - The investigation 13
 - Investigation reports 13
 - Misconduct proceedings 13
 - Criminal proceedings 14
 - Publishing the report 14
- Appendix 2: Evidence referred to in this report 15

Introduction

The purpose of this report

1. On 12 January 2016, I was appointed by the IPCC to carry out an independent investigation following a mandatory death or serious injury (DSI) referral from Leicestershire Police, after a vehicle containing Mr [REDACTED] and Mr [REDACTED] collided with railings following a police pursuit.
2. This is my report for the commission. It summarises and evaluates the evidence, refers to relevant documents and where necessary makes factual findings. In my conclusions I will:
 - set out the facts that have been established, the sequence of events and their consequences
 - give my opinion about whether the person who has died or been seriously injured had contact with the police and the extent to which this caused or contributed to the injuries.
 - explain, why having regard to the evidence, in my opinion, whether there is an indication that any person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner that would justify the bringing of criminal proceedings
 - draw attention to any evidence which may be the basis for a decision by the Commission delegate that performance of any subject of the investigation may have fallen below the standard expected of them.
 - draw attention to any lessons which may need to be learned by any organisation related to the investigation about which the Commission delegate may wish to make a recommendation.
3. It is intended that, for the purposes of this report, the powers and obligations of the Commission will be exercised by the Commission delegate.
4. On receipt of this report, the Commission delegate will send it to Leicestershire Police Force which must then advise the Commission delegate what action it will take in response to it. If the Commission delegate does not agree with Leicestershire Police Force it may make recommendations and ultimately directions about what action to take.

Background

5. At 1:49am on 12 January 2016, Police Constable (PC) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was driving a marked Vauxhall Astra registration number [REDACTED] motor vehicle, in the Saddington area of Leicestershire when he tried to stop a silver BMW, registration number [REDACTED]. PC [REDACTED] activated his blue lights and two tone sirens, but the BMW failed to stop and made off at speed. The pursued vehicle collided with roadside railings, resulting in serious injuries being sustained by the two rear passengers, Mr [REDACTED] and Mr [REDACTED].

The investigation

Terms of Reference

- D1
6. The terms of reference for this investigation were approved by commission delegate Stephen Bimson on 18 January 2016. The terms of reference specific to this investigation are:
 7. To investigate police contact with Mr [REDACTED] and Mr [REDACTED] prior to them sustaining their injuries.
 - a) Whether the police officers engaged in pursuing the vehicle were authorised to carry out the pursuit.
 - b) Whether the authorisation of the pursuit was proportionate and appropriate in the circumstances.
 - c) Whether the manner in which the pursuit was carried out was appropriate and in accordance with relevant policies and guidance.
 8. Further to paragraph 21A of Schedule 3 of the Police Reform Act 2002, to assess during the investigation whether any person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner justifying the bringing of disciplinary proceedings (i.e. whether there are any indications of 'conduct matters') and if so, follow the paragraph 21A procedure and make appropriate amendments to the terms of reference of the investigation.
 9. To consider and report on whether there is organisational learning, including
 - Whether any change in policy or practice would help to prevent a recurrence of the event, in incident or conduct investigated
 - Whether the incident highlights any good practice that should be shared.

Subjects of the investigation

10. There is no indication that a police officer committed a criminal offence or behaved in a way which would justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings. All police officers identified in the investigation were treated as witnesses.

Policies, procedures and legislation considered

11. A number of national and local policies were examined in relation to this incident, in order to ascertain whether the policies were complied with, and whether the existing policies were sufficient in these circumstances
12. The policy relevant to this investigation is set out by the College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice (APP), under Road Policing, Police pursuits.
13. The College of Policing sets high professional standards for drivers of police vehicles to ensure consistency across the 43 forces in England and Wales. They also have set standards for the police service on training, development, skills and qualifications. It is chapters one and two, Police Pursuits and Pursuit Management, which are relevant to this investigation.
14. Leicestershire Police Force does not have any specific policies around pursuits but chose to adhere to the policies laid out in the APP.
15. The APP has set procedures which initial phase trained officers must follow, they are to convey information regarding the circumstances and direction of the pursuit, so that control room operatives can properly organise and deploy appropriate resources, to risk assess the situation and provide information to control room staff regarding pursuit considerations, to drive in accordance with their level of authority and personal capability, avoiding increased risk and pass control to a tactical phase trained advanced driver as soon as possible.
16. The National Decision Model (NDM) is used by the police service to assist operational officers, planners, advisers and commanders to manage their response to a situation in a reasonable and proportionate way. The NDM must be applied when consideration is being given whether to pursue a vehicle, and continually evaluated during the pursuit. The NDM provides a framework for recording command decisions and the rationale behind them.

Summary of the evidence

- T4 17. At 1:49am on 12 January 2016 Police Constable (PC) [REDACTED] was driving a marked Vauxhall Astra, [REDACTED], which is a vehicle deemed suitable for a pursuit by the Leicestershire Police Fleet Manager. He was driving in the Saddington area of Leicestershire when he attempted to stop a silver BMW motor vehicle, registration number [REDACTED] due to his concerns about the manner of its driving. He activated his blue lights and two tone sirens, but the BMW failed to stop and made off at speed.
- D20, D21 18. PC [REDACTED] was confirmed to be a 'Standard Level' driver by the Leicestershire Police Training Department, prior to this PC [REDACTED] had been trained to an 'advanced' level. However, advance grade drivers were reverted to standard level following changes to the APP guidelines in July 2015, which included 'standard response drivers' being authorised to

initiate pursuits in marked police cars. This meant that 'advanced level' qualifications were deemed to be no longer required by Leicestershire Police, other than those employed to be drivers of senior officers or dignataries.

- D20 19. PC [REDACTED] was automatically designated as a 'Standard Level' driver with 'initial phase' pursuit authority, due to his previous 'Advanced Level' driving grade.
- D24 20. PC [REDACTED] began a pursuit of the vehicle and this was authorised by control room Inspector [REDACTED] [REDACTED] as stated in her statement dated 19 February 2016.
21. Throughout the pursuit PC [REDACTED] had engaged his body camera which recorded the pursuit and conclusion in its entirety.
- R1 22. The body camera footage from PC [REDACTED] indicated a high speed pursuit of the BMW occurred; there was no other recording device in the police vehicle. This is corroborated by PC [REDACTED] stating over his personal radio that speeds of seventy to eighty miles per hour were being reached by the police vehicle during the pursuit.
- T2 23. PC [REDACTED] explained over his radio that he was a pursuit trained driver and constantly updated the control room with the speeds of the BMW vehicle.
- D34 24. The Dynamic Risk Assessment (DRA) assists drivers in gauging the risk of a pursuit. Drivers must consider risk criteria including the environment, traffic regulations, pedestrian movement and volumes of traffic before beginning a pursuit. PC [REDACTED] categorised the pursuit as medium risk level. However this was his personal opinion as to the level of risk, as high, medium or low levels are not defined in either the APP guidelines or the NDM. This risk must be communicated to the control room, PC [REDACTED] discussed the risk together with any changes to the level of risk as the pursuit developed over his personal radio, and he updated the control room throughout. PC [REDACTED] stated that there were no pedestrians on the road and no other traffic/vehicles on the road; he also updated the control room on the weather conditions. PC [REDACTED] qualifies the risk of the pursuit as 'medium' throughout during his updates.
- D32 25. Although the APP policy does not define what low, medium or high risk means in terms of a pursuit, the principles of risk are defined by the College of Policing and state '*The willingness to make decisions in conditions of uncertainty (ie, risk taking) is a core professional requirement of all members of the police service*'. Police officers are expected to assess the risk of each situation they are in and Principle 5 of the risk levels defined by the College of Policing states that '*risks are seldom static. Situations alter, sometimes undergoing rapid and frequent change. Constant monitoring is needed to reassess and manage risks.*' PC [REDACTED] statement and the body worn camera footage show that he assessed risk throughout, assessing it against the APP Pursuit Policy requirements and defines his own personal risk assessment to which he qualified it at a 'medium' level using the rationale as documented previously.

26. The area in which the pursuit began was a residential area however the roads in which the vast majority of the pursuit occurred were rural.
- T2 27. At 1.54am PC [REDACTED] reported that the pursued vehicle had crashed into a set of railings. The body camera clearly indicated there was no contact between the police vehicle and the BMW.
28. The driver and front seat passenger ran from the vehicle, with the two rear seat passengers left in the vehicle with injuries. One, [REDACTED] with injuries to his leg and the other [REDACTED] with injuries to his head.
29. Both injured parties were later conveyed to Queens Medical Centre, Nottingham by ambulance for their injuries to be treated.
30. There is no footage of the BMW colliding with the railings; however PC [REDACTED] did immediately report the incident as soon as he happened upon the scene as evidenced with his body worn camera footage.
- S8
D10 31. PC's [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were in a marked police vehicle and were en route to join PC [REDACTED] to execute police pursuit tactics in an attempt to bring the pursuit to a conclusion. The tactics discussed over the airwaves included stinger strips, Tactical Pursuit and Containment (TPAC) and potential assistance from a police helicopter. They came across the BMW after it had collided with the railings and did not take part in the pursuit at any point, they did however, administer first aid to both Mr XXXXXXXX and Mr XXXXXXXX as they were the first officers on the scene after the crash had occurred.
- D22 32. PC [REDACTED] described the reason for attempting to stop the BMW due to it being a "*high powered expensive vehicle*" in an area where vehicles of that description had recently been targeted to be stolen.
- D24,
D34 33. Inspector [REDACTED] expressed in her statement that she felt the criteria for initial pursuit had been met. Inspector [REDACTED] also explained the rationale behind the authorisation of the pursuit and she indicated that in her view it was in line with the National Decision Model (NDM) because the vehicle registration number and identity of the driver were unknown at the time of authorising the pursuit and she had checked on the availability and location of the TPAC trained officers and their proximity to the pursuit. This is in line with the NDM as that process includes gathering information and intelligence and identifying tactical options and contingencies.
- D24,
D33 34. PC [REDACTED] pursuit was authorised by the Force Control Room Inspector [REDACTED]. In her statement she explained the risk assessment and her thought process behind sanctioning the pursuit. She deemed PC [REDACTED] was suitably trained and in a suitable vehicle, a Vauxhall Astra with audio and visual warning equipment. Inspector [REDACTED] also stated she felt PC [REDACTED] was giving clear and concise commentary and was risk assessing his pursuit, all of which are requirements of the APP pursuit guidelines. Inspector [REDACTED] said in her statement she deemed the initial pursuit was proportionate and reasonable.
- D25 35. The photographs taken by the police collision unit from the night of the

- incident indicate that there is no damage to the front of the police vehicle driven by PC [REDACTED]. This is evidenced in the Collision Investigation Package created by PC [REDACTED], who ran the collision investigation, in which he stated the police vehicle used by PC [REDACTED] *'had no panel or other damage as a result of the incident.'*
- R2
36. CCTV footage was collected by Leicestershire Police from a Co-Op store in Wigston, Leicestershire. This CCTV footage showed the BMW vehicle being pursued by the police vehicle driven by PC [REDACTED]. The CCTV evidence was analysed by PC [REDACTED] and he explained that the vehicles were travelling at different speeds at this time, creating a gap between the two cars. The gap between the cars was not calculated by PC [REDACTED]. The pursued car was travelling between 65 – 70mph and the police car was travelling as a speed between 54 – 59mph.
- R1, D22
37. In the body worn camera footage PC [REDACTED] stated that his initial reason to stop the BMW was the manner of driving. His statement provides clarification that his attention was drawn to the BMW as he believed it may have been stolen or being used in criminal activity and he initiated the pursuit when the vehicle appeared to attempt to evade his vehicle by speeding up as he followed behind.
38. Statements have been taken from all of the persons serving with the police who were involved in the incident and specific aspects of their evidence are addressed under the heading below.

Analysis of the Evidence

39. In order to reach conclusions it was necessary for me to analyse the evidence. In doing this, I considered whether I could determine any objective truths from the evidence. In other words, any independent evidence that I could rely upon to decide what happened. I also considered whether any version of events obtained during the investigation was inherently implausible or significantly undermined by other evidence.
40. During this investigation a volume of evidence was gathered. After thorough analysis of all the evidence, the investigation selected the most relevant evidence which address the terms of reference for the investigation. As such, not all the evidence gathered in the investigation is referred to in this report.
- R1, T2
41. It is clear from the evidence in the airwave transmissions and the images of the body worn camera that PC [REDACTED] had informed, and continued to inform the control room of the prevailing weather conditions, the road conditions and speed of the vehicle. In his statement he reiterated the risk assessment process with regards to the above.
- D33
42. The APP guidance requirements for a pursuit are that the pursuit must be authorised by an Inspector level officer, the level of risk posed by the pursued driver, the type of vehicle being pursued, the current/anticipated route in respect of the time of day, road, weather, traffic, specific considerations such as schools, licensed premises or off-road terrain.

- R1,
D32,
D34
D20,
D21,
D33
43. It is my opinion that the pursuit was authorised correctly and was proportionate and reasonable. The body worn camera footage highlighted that PC [REDACTED] was risk assessing the pursuit constantly, as per the NDM. The DRA was carried out and the control room were updated regularly regarding the risk, which remained at a medium level throughout the pursuit. The statement from Inspector [REDACTED] showed that PC [REDACTED] was authorised to pursue which is a requirement from the APP guidance and his training records also corroborate his ability to pursue. The body worn camera and airwave evidence also showed that PC [REDACTED] took into consideration the road and weather conditions and the physical surroundings of the pursuit which is also highlighted in the APP guidance and the DRA.
- D22
44. PC [REDACTED] statement states the roads as damp from rain previously in the day but that at the time of the pursuit the weather was cold and dry. The body worn camera footage shows that it was not raining and the police vehicle had not engaged its windscreen wipers.
- D20,
D21,
T4
45. Through the airwaves, body worn camera and PC [REDACTED] statement it is clear that PC [REDACTED] was aware of potential traffic and pedestrians through his updates via his radio. The body worn camera footage showed no oncoming traffic or pedestrians and PC [REDACTED] said in his statement that due to the road being dark *'any other vehicle would be able to see the blue flashing lights on my vehicle'*.
- T2,
D22,
D24,
D10,
S8
46. In PC [REDACTED] statement he gave the reason for stopping the pursued car was that its manner of driving had changed after he had began driving behind it. PC [REDACTED] statement explains that although the car was initially being driven faster than the allowed speed limit it was not being driven dangerously. However once PC [REDACTED] began to follow the car to do some preliminary intelligence checks on the car, the pursued car began to drive at high speeds.
- R2
47. Once the BMW car began to pull away from PC [REDACTED], it was then, according to his statement, that he activated his two tone sirens and blue lights and attempted to stop the BMW. This occurred on a national speed limit road, Kibworth Road, Leicestershire. The body worn camera footage and PC [REDACTED] statement show that he assessed the situation and with no other cars or pedestrians on the road deemed it suitable to maintain the pursuit. PC [REDACTED] gives an estimate of a fifty metre gap between himself and the pursued car and as the road changes to Warwick Road, PC [REDACTED] states he assessed the risk of the pursuit again and again checked for possible other road user and pedestrians. PC [REDACTED], in his statement, says that there were street lights on the Warwick Road which improved visibility, which is corroborated by the body worn camera footage. The APP policy for Police Pursuits state that visibility, road conditions and other road users (vehicle or pedestrian) must be assessed and reassessed prior to starting or maintaining a pursuit.
- D25
- D33
48. In PC [REDACTED] statement it is stated that high speeds of up to eighty miles per hour are reached, PC [REDACTED] explains however that due to the natural bends and changes within the roads these speeds are not

- maintained for long, which can be substantiated by the body worn camera footage.
- D22 49. PC [REDACTED] held all the requisite training to begin a 'spontaneous pursuit' and to take part in the 'initial phase' of a pursuit and was driving a suitable vehicle which is defined by the APP as a liveried vehicle with blue lights and two tone sirens
- T4 50. A suitable vehicle is assessed against a National Association of Police Fleet Managers (NAPFM) performance specification to determine whether a particular vehicle meets the requirement to determine whether it could be used for police response and general policing activity. PC [REDACTED] Vauxhall Astra would have been assessed against the NAPFM policy and was approved nationally as an immediate police specification response vehicle, deeming his car suitable to be used in a spontaneous pursuit.
- D22, D10, S8 51. The airwave evidence and the statements from PC [REDACTED], Inspector [REDACTED], PC [REDACTED] PC [REDACTED] provide an indication that tactics were being discussed and implemented to aid PC [REDACTED] bringing the pursuit to an end. Those tactics included a helicopter and Tactical Pursuit and Containment (TPAC) which were very close by at the time of the pursuit.
52. TPAC embodies several methods for attempting to stop pursued vehicles, including: rolling road blocks, stinger spike strips and containment methods. Stinger spikes are devices which are strips covered in metal barbs or spikes pointing upwards which are placed in the road to puncture and flatten tyres when driven over. Rolling road blocks are a method of gradually slowing down a vehicle or traffic and is implemented by using police vehicles driving alongside each other blocking lanes.
- R2 53. CCTV was collected from a Co-Op store in Wigston, Leicestershire. This CCTV shows the BMW vehicle pursued by the police vehicle driven by PC [REDACTED].
- D25 54. The photographs taken by the police collision unit from the night of the incident show that there is no damage to the front of the police vehicle driven by PC [REDACTED]. It is also clear that the police vehicle is not in direct contact with the pursued vehicle as evidenced by the body worn camera and collision investigators images.
- D22 55. As defined in the APP guidance a spontaneous pursuit occurs when the actions of the suspect driver in deciding to flee are triggered by the presence of a police vehicle. As PC [REDACTED] explained in his statement that '*due to the fact that the driver of the BMW had now changed his manner of his driving and was now driving away from me I made the decision that I was going to follow this vehicle and cause it to stop when safe to do so*' thereby providing justification for the pursuit.

Conclusions

56. Below, I have set out my conclusions for the commission delegate to consider.
57. These conclusions are my opinions, based on the evidence obtained during the investigation and summarised above.
58. Having analysed all of the evidence, it is my opinion that there is no indication that PC [REDACTED] or any other persons serving with the police who were involved in the pursuit may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner justifying disciplinary proceedings.
59. After reviewing my report and considering my recommendations, the Commission will decide whether any organisational learning has been identified that should be shared with the organisation in question. They may also recommend or direct, unsatisfactory performance procedures.

Death and serious injury investigations

60. To conclude this investigation, I must provide my opinions:
 - a) What contact did [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] have with the police?
 - b) To what extent did that contact cause or contribute to their injuries?
 - c) Why having regard to the evidence, there is no indication that any person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner that would justify the bringing of criminal proceedings.

What contact did [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] have with the police?

61. It is clear there is police contact in this investigation through the form of the pursuit. There is no direct physical contact between the officer or the police vehicle and Mr [REDACTED] and Mr [REDACTED] or the vehicle they are in.

To what extent did that contact cause or contribute to their injuries?

62. The injuries sustained would not have occurred if the pursuit had not taken place, however as explained throughout the report the pursuit was carried out in accordance with applicable policies and guidance and was in my opinion proportionate, reasonable and justified.

Why having regard to the evidence, there is no indication that any person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner that would justify the bringing of criminal proceedings.

63. As explained previously the weather conditions were clear and dry on this night and it appears that the risks with this pursuit were being continually assessed and managed by PC [REDACTED]. The highest speeds were only reached for short period of times due to the natural changes in the roads as the pursuit occurred.
64. PC [REDACTED] was suitably trained and was in a suitable vehicle to enable him to conduct pursuits. He kept the Force Control Room up to date as he was required to do regarding the prevailing driving and weather conditions as required by APP guidance and the Force Control Room Inspector [REDACTED] authorised the pursuit to continue as per APP guidance.

Provisional organisational learning recommendations

65. After reviewing this report, the Commission will consider whether learning has been identified for any organisation involved in the investigation. If any learning is identified, the Commission can make organisational learning recommendations and send these to the organisations in question under separate cover.

66. Often these recommendations and any responses to them are published on the recommendations section of the [IPCC Website](#)

67. In this case, I have not identified any learning to draw to the Commission delegate's attention.

Appendix 1: The role of the IPCC

The IPCC carries out its own independent investigations into complaints and incidents involving the police, HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the National Crime Agency (NCA) and Home Office immigration and enforcement staff when the seriousness or the public interest require it.

We are completely independent of the police and the government. IPCC commissioners by law may never have worked for the police.

All cases are overseen by a Commission delegate, providing strategic direction and scrutinising the investigation.

The investigation

At the outset of an investigation a lead investigator will be appointed who will be responsible for the day to day running of the investigation on behalf of the Commission. This may involve taking witness statements, interviewing subjects to the investigation, analysing CCTV footage, reviewing documents, obtaining forensic and other expert evidence, as well as liaison with the coroner, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and other agencies.

They are supported by a team including other investigators, lawyers, press officers and other specialist staff.

Meaningful updates are provided to families and other stakeholders both inside and outside the IPCC at regular intervals.

Throughout the investigation, a series of reviews and quality checks will take place.

The IPCC investigator often makes early contact with the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and are sometimes provided with investigative advice during the course of the investigation however we are usually asked by the CPS to keep any such advice confidential.

Investigation reports

Once the investigator has gathered the evidence they must prepare a report. The report must summarise the evidence and refer to or attach any relevant documents. If notices of investigation have been served in the course of the investigation (due to special requirements being attached to a complaint or conduct being recorded) the report must also give the investigator's opinion about whether any police officer or member of staff has a case to answer for misconduct.

The report must then be given to the Commission delegate who will decide if a criminal offence may have been committed by any of the subjects of the investigation and whether it is appropriate to refer the case to the CPS for a charging decision.

The Commission delegate will also decide whether to make individual or wider learning recommendations for the police.

Misconduct proceedings

The report must be given to the appropriate authority responsible for the subjects of the investigation. They must then inform the Commission what action they propose to take, in particular whether they will bring misconduct charges in relation to any of the police officers or staff who were subjects of the investigation. If the Commission delegate is unhappy with the appropriate authority's response, the Commission has powers to recommend or ultimately direct it to bring disciplinary or unsatisfactory performance proceedings.

Criminal proceedings

If there is an indication that a criminal offence may have been committed by any subject of our investigation the IPCC may refer a subject to the Crown Prosecution Service. The CPS will then decide whether to bring a prosecution against any person. If they decide to prosecute, and there is a not guilty plea, there may be a trial. Relevant witnesses identified during our investigation may be asked to attend the court. The court will then establish whether the defendant is guilty beyond all reasonable doubt.

Publishing the report

After all criminal proceedings relating to the investigation have concluded, and at a time when the IPCC is satisfied that any other misconduct or inquest proceedings will not be prejudiced by publication, the IPCC may publish its investigation report.

Redactions might be made to the report at this stage to ensure that individuals' personal data is sufficiently protected and occasionally for other reasons.

Appendix 2: Evidence referred to in this report

Throughout this investigation a volume of evidence was obtained and reviewed.

Not all the evidence gathered during the investigation has been referred to in this report. This report makes reference to the following relevant evidence:

Ref	Evidence	Details
D33	College of Policing Policy	Authorised Professional Practice (APP) – Police Pursuit Policy
R1	Body Worn Camera	Download of footage from PC [REDACTED] Body Worn Camera from the night of the incident
T2	Police Radio Airwaves	Airwaves records of officers responding to the pursuit and from staff in the control room
D20 D21	Leicestershire Driving School Letter	Letter from training team from Leicestershire Driving School detailing PC [REDACTED] training and 'advanced' level driving requirements
D25	Investigation Package	Collision report made by PC [REDACTED] from Northamptonshire Police Force
D22	Statement	Statement of PC [REDACTED]
D24	Statement	Statement of Control Room Inspector [REDACTED]
S8	Statement	Statement of PC [REDACTED]
D10	Statement	Statement of PC [REDACTED]
D1	Terms of Reference	Document approved on 18 January by Commission Delegate, Stephen Bimson
R2	CCTV Footage	Download of CCTV footage from Co-Op shop on Moat Road, Leicestershire
D3-8	Leicestershire Police Control Log	The entire incident was recorded on an electronic log. The log contains information on who responded and outcomes.
D32	College of Policing Policy	Authorised Professional Practice (APP) - Dynamic Risk Assessment and Risk Principles -
D34	College of Policing Policy	Authorised Professional Practice (APP) – National Decision Model
T4	Leicestershire Police Fleet	E-mail clarification from Leicestershire Police Fleet Manager

Edward Marshall

Lead Investigator, IPCC

Date – 05/07/2016